The Allied force around Guadalcanal had more cruisers and destroyers than Mikawa's five heavy cruisers, two old light cruisers, and one destroyer. Criticism of Richmond Kelly Turner also reaches back to his failure to pass on his assessment that Pearl Harbor faced a high probability of attack, leaving local defenders focused on sabotage. At Guadalcanal, the command arrangement weakened the screen at the critical moment. Turner summoned Victor Crutchley to a meeting, and Crutchley brought his flagship and staff as contemporary practice encouraged. Turner should instead have sent a staff officer to coordinate with the screening commander. The peacetime habit of calling a subordinate admiral to headquarters disrupted combat command and left the anchorage exposed. The U.S. Navy abandoned that practice after Savo Island, a concrete institutional lesson from the defeat.
Chapter · 35:08-39:25
Allied command disruption before Savo Island
A command meeting pulled Victor Crutchley and his flagship away from the screening force as Mikawa approached the Guadalcanal transports.