Searching an ocean as large as the Pacific requires wide-area sensors, making satellites more practical than trying to cover the same space with vast numbers of long-range drones. Satellites are not invulnerable: the SM-3 family has demonstrated an anti-satellite capability, and other systems can threaten or interfere with orbital sensors. Navies have also used false courses, smoke, thermal decoys, and jamming to mislead surveillance for decades. Public evidence suggests that Britain places more emphasis on electronic or soft-kill methods than on a declared hard-kill anti-satellite weapon. The result is a reconnaissance contest in which neither the satellite nor the carrier force can assume uncontested information.
Notable Point · 50:05-53:21
Satellites, deception, and the search for a carrier group
Ocean surveillance favors satellites, but anti-satellite weapons, jamming, decoys, and deceptive movement can disrupt the targeting chain.