The political wish to use the fleet in Hawaii as a deterrent collided with James Richardson's assessment that it was visibly unready for active operations. The original 1938 Hawaiian detachment had been a scouting force of cruiser and destroyer divisions, one carrier, and supporting ships, with Kimmel among the officers sent forward. In May 1940 Richardson was ordered to issue a press release claiming that he had requested an extended stay, although he had made no such request and lacked the ammunition and targets needed for training. He argued that Japan's military government would recognize a bluff when the fleet lacked auxiliaries, ammunition, supplies, and training support. A properly supplied fleet on the Pacific coast would signal resolve more credibly. Kimmel later stripped ships for war despite criticism that he was being precipitous, an attempt to mitigate the weakness he inherited.
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Richardson's warning about an unsupported deterrent
Kimmel inherited a forward fleet whose predecessor argued that Hawaii lacked the supplies and protection needed for credible deterrence.