Chapter · 3:20:00-3:26:50

Rheinübung began with a strained command relationship and an avoidable fuel problem

Lütjens's familiar fleet staff may have hindered communication with Lindemann, while his refusal to top up Bismarck in Norway left the ship short of fuel.

Notes

Bringing a familiar former flag captain onto Bismarck's full fleet staff may have made it harder for Lütjens to build direct working communication with Captain Lindemann. Trusted advisers covered intelligence, navigation, gunnery, and weather, and he probably discussed decisions within that circle instead of consulting both ship captains. At Norway, Prinz Eugen refueled while Bismarck did not take a full top-up, even though the battleship had left the Baltic short and burned more fuel en route. Lütjens may have expected to use a tanker farther north, but Bismarck never refueled during the operation. The decision differed sharply from his repeated replenishment during Operation Berlin. Earlier close calls and the loss of the Narvik destroyers contributed to his expectation that he would eventually be sacrificed.