Moderate rearmament and negotiation in the 1930s did not prevent war when revisionist leaders interpreted restraint as unwillingness to fight. Mussolini entered the conflict expecting France to collapse and Britain to negotiate, hoping Italy could claim a share of the spoils despite its own lack of preparation. That decision widened the war and made British strategy far more difficult even though the calculation behind it was badly mistaken. Potential aggressors judge announcements, defence funding, procurement, and the depth of reserves when deciding whether a quick gamble might succeed. Modern reservists may be capable and committed while still being too few, often serving as individual gap-fillers rather than complete deployable ships or units.
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Rearmament is also a signal to potential aggressors
The closing strategic argument links inadequate forces and reserves to the dangerous impression that an opponent can gamble on a quick victory.