Was Rear Admiral King or the promotion system at fault?

Should Rear Admiral King be blamed for his wartime command failures, or did the Royal Navy's promotion system put an unsuitable officer in that position?

King met the system's professional criteria but failed to request essential ammunition information and then delayed after receiving it, so the responsibility rests primarily with his command decisions.

King had the training and rank needed to obtain ammunition information and respond to the tactical situation. The troop convoy he allowed through was probably Italian, despite the question's description of it as German. Following the letter of the rules meant checking ammunition stocks before detaching cruisers, while following their spirit could have meant keeping the force together against heavier opposition. King did neither. He obtained the essential information only when a subordinate supplied it and then took roughly thirty to forty minutes to make the correct decision. The failure concerned information a commander was responsible for requesting and using promptly, rather than a judgment available only in hindsight.