Britain and the United States kept contingency plans for war with each other because they were the two largest naval powers, even though an actual conflict was unlikely. Their competition emphasized the quality and gun power of new ships rather than a direct race to match hull numbers. Germany's pre-1914 risk-fleet strategy deliberately used quantity to challenge British naval strength. Qualitative one-upmanship can be less destabilizing than a repeated public count of how many ships each side is building. After World War I, British planners also had to leave a mixed system of qualitative competition with several powers and quantitative competition with Germany while Japan and the United States pursued their own numerical rivalry. That transition shows why planners can misread a security environment when they apply the logic of one kind of competition to another. Carrier defence must be based on an accurate threat assessment rather than inherited assumptions.
Notable Point · 1:12:16-1:16:51
Distinguish qualitative from quantitative naval races
Interwar Anglo-American competition focused on improving ship quality, unlike the fleet-number challenge that made the Anglo-German race more threatening.