Why purchased commissions could still produce wartime officers

Did the British Army’s purchase system promote wealth rather than ability?

Yes, wealth mattered, but wartime selection, service requirements, non-purchase advancement, and the pension role made the system more complicated than simple rank-buying.

Purchase was an inequitable system, yet wartime conditions could make it function better than its reputation suggests. Ineffective officers faced real physical risk, while capable officers could gain money and advancement through success. Minimum time in rank and promotion for hazardous service placed limits on pure purchase. Purchase-like systems were widespread, and selling a commission acted as a retirement fund, so the institution combined patronage, manpower, and pension functions. A wealthy colonel might raise a regiment and take public credit while an experienced major or lieutenant-colonel handled its field administration. Staff conferences and pre-battle social events could keep the patron away while senior officers and non-commissioned officers prepared the unit, an informal workaround rather than proof that purchase selected the best commanders.