Frobisher and Effingham could not be disposed of until 1936, even though their ages would otherwise have allowed replacement in 1932 and 1933. British Commonwealth cruiser replacement completed before 31 December 1936 was capped at 91,000 tons. Japan received equally specific permissions for replacing Tama, laying down destroyer tonnage in 1935 and 1936, and anticipating submarine replacements. The treaty was therefore managing when each navy could replace particular parts of its force, rather than setting only broad ceilings. Its logic assumed that tightly constrained construction would reduce fear. This also removed shipbuilding as a visible signal of preparedness and deterrent resolve.
Notable Point · 13:47-16:33
How prescriptive replacement schedules constrained fleets
Britain's 91,000-ton pre-1937 replacement ceiling and Japan's detailed permissions turned general limitation into close management of fleet development.