Postwar carrier ambitions and Stalin's naval choice

Interwar carrier aircraft were limited by engine power-to-weight and the structural strength demanded by deck operations, but improving performance encouraged Soviet interest in carriers. Stalin received Allied wartime reports about submarine and carrier operations, and Soviet officers sometimes accompanied missions as observers. The scale of D-Day demonstrated an amphibious capability that made the Soviet Union's long northern and Pacific coastlines a security concern. Stalin's large-fleet policy promised to secure maritime approaches, reinforce Soviet status, and raise the cost of foreign intervention. His personal authority and confidence in the loyalty of the system gave a carrier and battleship programme political possibilities that his more land-oriented successors were less willing to support. In this interpretation, the postwar years under Stalin offered the strongest prospect of building a Soviet fleet capable of contesting control of the world's oceans. Naval aviation fluctuated between carrier operations and shore-supported defence during this period, leaving its future mission uncertain and limiting how many aircraft ideas entered service.