The loss comparison returns to the doctrine problem. Japan lost three fleet carriers, oilers, hundreds of aircraft, and nearly 3,000 personnel, while most American aircraft losses came from the hazardous night recovery rather than enemy action. Kantai Kessen might have been viable in 1941 if a weakened American fleet had advanced at the end of a long logistics line against Japan's well-trained early-war force. By 1944 Japan was trying to impose that decisive battle after its air groups, coordination, command structure, and replacement capacity had eroded. Deterrence and war planning become dangerous when they assume the opponent will behave foolishly or obediently follow a preferred script.
Notable Point · 1:41:34-1:47:42
The final doctrine lesson
The conclusion weighs the battle's losses and argues that Kantai Kessen could only work if Japan did not assume the enemy would cooperate.