By 1938 the escort-carrier idea was widely understood, but mass conversion of merchant ships would have advertised that Britain expected a long maritime war and could itself be accused of raising tensions. Treasury resistance was reinforced by beliefs that strategic bombing might shorten conflict, France would remain in the fight, Norway would constrain German access, and Italy or Japan posed geographically different problems. The disasters of 1940 overturned nearly every one of those assumptions at once. The same prewar logic included the belief associated with Giulio Douhet that bombers could break a state quickly, while the later nuclear version raises a different and more destructive question. Escort carriers and sloops expose a procurement paradox: inexpensive enabling ships can become essential in war while remaining politically hardest to justify before the emergency exists. Waiting for certainty avoids a provocative peacetime program but also leaves mobilization to compete with every other urgent wartime demand.
Chapter · 1:24:36-1:29:03
Essential wartime ships are hardest to justify in peace
Escort carriers and sloops became indispensable after war began, but their mobilization purpose made them politically and financially difficult to build before the emergency.