Wars are fought with forces ready for service, while projected fleets on paper cannot answer an immediate crisis. Russia's limited infrastructure had already weakened support, preparation, and operations in 1904-05, then slowed the postwar rebuild. That record raises doubts about whether the Borodino-class battlecruisers were a sensible investment for a predominantly land power. The Gangut and Imperatritsa Mariya classes look more defensible because they were viable ships matched to Russian theatres and means. One alternative would buy fewer early ships abroad and direct the released capital into infrastructure for later domestic construction. Fleet plans therefore have to be judged by delivery time, foreign-order risk, and usable national capacity.
Notable Point · 1:03:47-1:05:52
Paper fleets do not fight wars
The comparison between ships available, ships planned, and national infrastructure tests whether Russia's most ambitious capital-ship projects justified their opportunity cost.