Peattie's account identifies failures to anticipate the air war, adapt decisions during it, and sustain aviation against American industrial strength. The counterargument is that Japan prepared for the form of war it had a chance of winning, which depended on opponents advancing rapidly into its defenses. The planned chain of island air bases would let long-range bombers move to meet an advance, the 'unsinkable carriers' idea attributed to Yamamoto. In that reading, Japanese attrition meant weakening an approaching fleet before decisive battle. A prolonged contest in which the Allies took and consolidated successive bases presented a different problem. British and American planning had already recognized the danger of charging into Japanese home waters. Much earlier investment in Japanese industry and infrastructure could have prolonged resistance in the alternative considered here, but could not have made that slower contest winnable.
Notable Point · 19:38-23:21
Operational attrition versus a methodical Pacific advance
Japan's proposed attrition before decisive battle depended on a rapid enemy advance; a methodical campaign of taking and consolidating bases defeated that premise.