Concentrating on U-boats made the German naval threat more one-dimensional. Britain could slow work on carriers and capital ships while prioritising destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and sloops for anti-submarine warfare. This choice reflected its principal Atlantic and Mediterranean responsibilities and Germany's declining surface force. Italy's navy had recovered from Matapan and Taranto but remained constrained by fuel and support shortages. Those circumstances reduced the competing surface threat while German submarine construction continued. The Royal Canadian Navy illustrates the resulting emphasis on escorts: the comparison describes it as the world's third-largest navy with only a single cruiser above its smaller ships. Anti-submarine escorts were also easier to build and operate than submarines, making an escort-heavy response easier to sustain.
Notable Point · 53:30-57:29
Why a submarine-only threat was easier to counter
The closing strategic argument explains why concentrating on U-boats left the Allies free to prioritize anti-submarine escorts, corvettes, and frigates.