Shokaku and Zuikaku fit interception-attrition operations, decisive strikes, and a quality-based deterrent strategy. Yet a deterrent had to be visible and powerful enough to shape an opponent's calculations, and the carriers were neither publicized nor enlarged to that standard. The doctrinal ideal was a carrier counterpart to Yamato, closer to Lexington in displacement, with 108 operational aircraft divided among fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo bombers, plus a larger reserve. Japan's resources and construction capacity forced a smaller design. The gap between the ideal and the completed ships reveals the limit of a quality strategy built on industrial scarcity.
Notable Point · 1:05:12-1:13:41
Not big enough for the doctrine
Shokaku and Zuikaku were excellent fleet carriers, but Japan's deterrent doctrine really called for a larger and more publicly intimidating carrier equivalent to Yamato.