Tirpitz's theory required Britain to remain permanently weak after a costly battle and expected other powers to exploit that weakness. British recovery after the Napoleonic and Anglo-Dutch wars made the first assumption historically doubtful. The proposed attackers were also implausible: the United States still depended on British colliers for global operations, France's fleet was weak, Italy was constrained within the Mediterranean, and Japan had little reason to attack. Britain could close Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, reinforce the latter with the British Indian Army, and use mines and torpedoes to contain Mediterranean opponents. The risk fleet depended on a follow-on coalition that did not actually exist.
Notable Point · 26:47-29:53
No plausible coalition stood ready to finish Britain
The theory assumed other navies would exploit British losses, but the United States, France, Italy, and Japan each lacked either the capacity or motive to do so.