Massie's account places the naval race inside the diplomacy of the First Moroccan Crisis. Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne viewed Germany's pressure as an attempt to break the Entente Cordiale, while First Sea Lord John Fisher responded with private belligerence that went well beyond government policy. Fisher privately urged a united Anglo-French fleet and boasted that it could deal with the German fleet, the Kiel Canal, and Schleswig-Holstein within a fortnight. Britain officially denied any intention of attacking Germany, but the government would not accept a German naval base or coaling station on Morocco's Atlantic coast. Such a position could threaten the sea lanes to South Africa and around the Cape, turning a diplomatic dispute into a maritime security problem. Lansdowne's support for France and discussion of wider contingencies brought the two countries closer to military cooperation.
Chapter · 6:51-9:06
The Morocco crisis, Atlantic bases, and British sea lanes
A passage on the First Moroccan Crisis shows British leaders defending the Entente while treating any German Atlantic base as a threat to routes around South Africa and the Cape.