British leaders could trust the honour of French naval officers while distrusting the political government that issued their orders. Better choice of intermediaries and fuller communication might have prevented the clash, as the peaceful settlement at Alexandria suggests. Placing Godfroy at Mers-el-Kébir may have improved communication, although Cunningham's overwhelming position made Alexandria easier to settle regardless of the French commander. British planning assumed the French and Italian fleets would balance one another, so allowing both to fall into the Axis camp threatened Britain's survival strategy and its margin against Japan. Britain had repeatedly destroyed naval forces it perceived as existential threats, including at Copenhagen. Toulon later demonstrated that the French Navy would deny its ships to Germany, but Britain could not know that outcome in 1940 and acted on the worst case.
Chapter · 52:48-58:29
Mers-el-Kebir as a strategic failure of trust
The British attack is framed around distrust of the Vichy government, failed senior communication, and fear that the French fleet would overturn the naval balance.