Mers-el-Kebir as a communications failure

Was the British attack at Mers-el-Kebir mainly the result of French pride and incompetence?

The crisis grew from poor orders, broken communication, rank sensitivities, and British fear that the French fleet might be handed to Germany.

The French admiral had narrow instructions and little freedom to improvise, while communication between the French government, its officers, and Britain had already failed badly. Rank also mattered because the British negotiator spoke French but was not senior enough to satisfy the admiral receiving him. British demands included moving the fleet to distant French territory, where it could remain French while staying beyond easy German control. One counterfactual places it in French Indochina, where a later Japanese attack could bring the war in the Far East forward and complicate Germany's relationship with both France and Japan. Joining the Free French was Britain's preferred outcome, and removing the ships from the combat area came next. With the whole French Navy joining the Allies, the added force is expected to bring the Mediterranean and North African campaigns to an early end. The central British fear was that the French government could order crews ashore and hand their ships to Germany, even if the sailors had no intention of fighting Britain. Sinking the ships was the worst option on the British list, chosen because assurances from a government that had left the war no longer seemed sufficient protection against a German seizure.