M1 linked carrier command, torpedo performance, and strike concentration

With no dedicated Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers in 1929, the senior carrier remarks came through the vice admiral commanding the battlecruiser squadron, placing the technical debate inside a fast-force command structure. Short-range torpedo aiming depended heavily on pilot judgment, while differences in torpedo reliability and practice helped explain the contrasting results of the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets. Senior officers argued that a concerted attack by all available torpedo bombers should be more effective than separate attacks from each carrier. Concentration, however, imposed a delay and became harder to control at night, when several smaller formations might be more manageable than one mass. The exercise also tested how many fighters should remain over the fleet and how many should escort the striking force. Some officers expected the rear guns of two-seat torpedo bombers to reduce the need for fighter protection, revealing a doctrinal assumption that later combat would challenge.