Kantai Kessen made sense within Japanese experience of Tsushima and the Russo-Japanese War, where one great victory could support negotiation. Britain and the United States did not share that expectation and were more likely to return with larger forces after a defeat. Their industrial capacity, especially the American buildup while supplying other belligerents before direct entry into the war, made that persistence sustainable. Japan could not win a long war of attrition and lacked the power to invade the continental United States. Decisive battle was therefore both a poor fit for the opponent and the only plausible escape from an even worse material contest.
Notable Point · 1:27:55-1:30:43
Why Kantai Kessen could not solve Japan's industrial mismatch
The decisive-battle doctrine derived from Tsushima offered Japan its only apparent shortcut, but it did not fit British and American persistence or industrial depth.