Jellicoe historically made major decisions with little dependable information from his battlecruiser commander. Commodore William Goodenough of HMS Southampton helped tell the Grand Fleet what was happening when more senior officers had failed to do so. Room 40's misleading answer about Scheer's call sign was a separate problem: the battlecruiser force should have maintained a continuing flow of positions and sightings. Jutland's decisive daylight phases unfolded within only a few hours, so even short reporting delays consumed a large share of the available maneuver time. Had Jellicoe received that information, he could have maintained speed and reached the main action earlier.
Chapter · 19:22-24:30
Information flow: the opening failure at Jutland
The analysis identifies the battlecruiser fleet's poor reporting to Jellicoe as the key weakness, with Commodore Goodenough's initiative partly compensating for it.