American communications between Pearl Harbor and Washington were difficult for Japan to intercept, while Japanese forward communications were exposed to American listening stations and submarines. Against that disadvantage, Yamamoto and the naval high command felt compelled to act after Coral Sea and the raids on Japan. Yamamoto's personal authority made him the dominant operational voice within a formal leadership structure that also included the chief of the Naval General Staff and the Navy minister. Nagumo would command First Air Fleet in the resulting operation. Proposals included renewed action in the Indian Ocean and a push toward Australia, but the reorganising Eastern Fleet, increasing Allied resources, and improving intelligence made those choices less attractive. Midway emerged from competing proposals as a compromise intended to reclaim the initiative.
Chapter · 20:07-26:31
Japanese intelligence geography and pressure to act
The geography of radio interception favored the United States as Yamamoto and Japan's naval leadership searched for an operation that would restore momentum.