Italy's central Mediterranean position should have favored land-based air reconnaissance, but severe rivalry between the Regia Marina and Regia Aeronautica made naval commanders distrust that support. The Regia Aeronautica inherited an argument associated here with Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell that independent air power could supplant naval forces. Mussolini's simultaneous control of both ministries made policy depend on whichever service faction held his attention rather than on a stable division of responsibility. Information could be forced through long service chains before reaching a ship, so launching aircraft from cruisers gave the navy direct control of collection. The IMAM Ro.43 compounded the problem through fragile landing characteristics and a tendency to return to shore rather than to its parent ship. Once ashore, aircraft did not always return promptly to naval control. The navy then had to reclaim its own reconnaissance capacity from the air force.
Chapter · 42:10-1:00:58
Why the Regia Marina insisted on shipborne reconnaissance
Italian cruisers carried aircraft because the navy could not rely on timely reconnaissance from an independent and institutionally hostile air force.