Hawke, sea control, and the decision to attack Belle Île

Corbett's account begins with criticism that Hawke had won at Quiberon Bay but had done too little with the resulting command of the sea. It also gives Hawke a practical defence: destroying ships in shelter was fundamentally a combined operation, and risking large numbers of sailors ashore could weaken the fleet's ability to maintain control. Pitt's renewed attack on Belle Île then shows the transition from sea control to coastal action through frigate reconnaissance, close blockade, and a joint decision by Commodore Keppel and General Hodgson to attempt the least impossible landing place. The first assault reached the beach under naval cover but could not scale the prepared heights, while a small grenadier party that found a route was isolated before support arrived. The assault cost about 500 men, and a subsequent gale destroyed half the flat-bottomed boats on which further landings depended.