Crete's larger size makes prior investment decisive, but the same basic problem seen at Malta and Gibraltar still applies: a competently held fortified island is intrinsically difficult to take. The counterfactual treats a fortified Crete as a plausible extension of Greek policy rather than an isolated military fantasy. Metaxas maintained useful ties with Britain partly because Italian ambitions kept Greece outside a coherent fascist alignment. Greece historically concentrated its late-1930s fortification effort on northern land approaches, but Crete also offered agriculture, fishing, lignite, gypsum, iron ore, marble, ports, and a defensible island position. The possible offshore hydrocarbons are explicitly excluded from the period decision because they became known only after the war. Any major transformation would need to begin well before 1936.
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Why Greece might invest in Crete
The scenario begins with Greece's strategic position, Metaxas's uneasy foreign alignments, and Crete's economic resources.