William III assembled 11,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry aboard 250 merchantmen, protected by 39 battleships, 26 frigates, 10 fireships, and 20 other vessels, but planned to avoid the English fleet rather than defeat it. Arthur Herbert, an English naval officer who had joined William, commanded the invasion fleet with instructions to dissuade his former colleagues from attacking. The English expected a northern landing, while favorable easterly winds pinned Dartmouth's ships behind the Gunfleet Sands as the Dutch sailed west and landed at Torbay. French strategic misreading, exaggerated reports, changing winds, and uncertainty over loyalties further discouraged an interception. The invasion succeeded without the fleet action that raw force comparisons might suggest was necessary.
Chapter · 5:20-9:02
The Dutch invasion of 1688 and an English fleet that did not fight
Richard Harding's Sea Power and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830 uses William III's invasion to show how weather, intelligence, political support, and caution neutralized a powerful English fleet.