Khrushchev had the political position to continue Stalin's large-warship programs but did not share the same maritime outlook. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States could deploy carriers, cruisers, and even battleships if required, presenting the full visible range of naval power. The Soviet Union could not assemble an equivalent surface force to push through or stage a matching demonstration. Its Sverdlov-class ships were useful presence cruisers, but they lacked the status and weight of the American formation. A larger Soviet force could have altered the brinkmanship, although it might also have increased the danger of war. The crisis exposed the cost of treating submarines and strategic missiles as substitutes for every function of a surface fleet.
Chapter · 1:29:36-1:32:58
The Cuban Missile Crisis exposed a Soviet surface-fleet gap
Khrushchev's preference for submarines and missiles left the Soviet Union without the visible surface force needed to contest the American naval quarantine on equal terms.