During the Russo-Turkish crisis, the British cabinet ordered the fleet into the Straits on 23 January, reversed the decision the next day after the sultan accepted Russian peace proposals, and changed course again in February. Foreign Secretary Lord Derby trusted Russian assurances, while Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, Queen Victoria, and part of public opinion pressed for a harder line. Ambassador Henry Layard's unofficial correspondence with Disraeli added another channel of confusion. The reversals demoralized the Ottomans, encouraged Russia, and made Britain appear irrelevant, while Layard's erroneous report that Russian troops had occupied Istanbul collapsed opposition to action in London. The false report may have been deliberate, though that remains uncertain. A large war-preparation credit and orders for the fleet to protect British life and property followed, but inconsistent direction had already weakened the signal.
Notable Point · 3:09-5:00
Constantinople crisis: policy reversals weaken the signal
Britain's repeated changes of direction over Constantinople spent deterrent credibility before the fleet entered the crisis.