Lütjens's central strategic metaphor was that the Kriegsmarine should not feed ships to the Royal Navy in teaspoonfuls. A concentrated force could overwhelm an individual convoy battleship before it inflicted disabling damage. Its existence would also compel Britain to gather fast capital ships and carriers for the hunt while assigning several slower battleships to each valuable convoy. That concentration could drain the Mediterranean, reduce options in the Far East, accelerate British battleship construction, and force refits of older ships. Lütjens even envisioned coordination with heavy cruisers and, if available, Graf Zeppelin. The eventual sortie sent Bismarck and Prinz Eugen before Tirpitz or the Scharnhorst-class ships were ready.
Notable Point · 3:03:57-3:13:42
A concentrated German battle force could stretch British convoy protection
His preferred Atlantic strategy was to concentrate Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau rather than risk isolated ships.