A combined Royal Navy-US Navy carrier force

What could a combined Royal Navy-US Navy carrier force do in the Pacific?

It could combine British experience in sustained fighter defence with American strike capacity, creating a larger and more resilient task force than either side could always field alone.

Availability is the limiting factor rather than paper fleet totals. A combined force with two British and two American carriers could keep a large fighter screen airborne while freeing the other decks to launch a concentrated strike. The British carriers' organization around sustained air defence complements the larger American striking groups. Paper equality could therefore hide a readiness advantage: carriers returning from operations still need destoring, inspection, and work-up, while a larger Allied pool can rotate hulls and still produce a four-deck group. The additional ships could also sustain a second rotating fleet or task group under Somerville instead of placing every available carrier in one formation. Japan would have to retain carriers against more than one direction of attack rather than concentrating every available deck. Under Somerville and theatre direction from Nimitz, that division of labour could produce a genuinely integrated Allied carrier force rather than parallel national detachments.