The argument begins with battleships as products of peer competition, but the Cold War did not produce a symmetrical surface battlefleet contest. One bloc held overwhelming sea power while the Soviet Union emphasized submarines, missiles, and other asymmetric counters, reducing the reason to invest in a new battleship class. Large hulls nevertheless retain a defensive advantage because they can carry more interceptors, close-in weapons, electronic warfare systems, decoys, and redundant equipment. The later decline in fleet variety also erased much of the old signaling ladder between a sloop, destroyer, cruiser, local flagship, battleship, and full squadron. Governments now often send whatever hull is available, making it harder to communicate carefully calibrated levels of interest and commitment.
Chapter · 42:23-47:17
Cold War asymmetry removed battleships and flattened naval signaling
A bipolar maritime order made battleships less useful, while today's smaller force structures often leave governments with only an escort or a full carrier group to signal resolve.