Churchill's failure to explain the Navy's First World War strategy

How did Churchill undermine the Royal Navy by supporting the Army's narrative in 1914, and what if he had done his job as First Lord?

Sending the Army to France was defensible. The main failure was leaving the cabinet uninformed about naval strategy, with Fisher's influence offered as a tentative explanation for Churchill's inability to make an independent naval case.

Sending the British Army to France in 1914 was defensible because it was needed to help fill the gap after the German advance through the Low Countries. An amphibious landing behind the Germans was an alternative, though its success was uncertain. Churchill's failure as First Lord was to explain the Navy's strategic aims and activities to the cabinet. Lloyd George later discovered that successive First Lords had received naval briefings without passing them on and required weekly reports explaining naval operations. Dr. Clarke offers a tentative interpretation that Fisher had trained Churchill to repeat his arguments without giving him the understanding needed to make an independent naval case. In that interpretation, Churchill's renewed effort in 1939 to pause capital ships, cruisers, and carriers in favor of escorts repeated Fisher's earlier prescription. Henderson's successors lacked the influence to resist him, and by the time Churchill listened to Fraser the damage had been done.