Mines favour a defensive naval power because they force the stronger opponent to search, sweep, protect routes, and commit far more ships than the attacker uses. The British response to a suspected German minelaying force involved three large cruisers, including HMS Glorious and HMS Courageous, 27 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers, yet still failed to intercept the raiders. The maritime insurgency comparison follows from that imbalance: a dispersed, uncertain threat demands a counterinsurgency-like commitment of patrol and security forces. The same logic is applied to a hypothetical Chinese effort to burden the United States with mines laid by dedicated warships or discreetly converted trawlers. The class therefore shows how a modest specialist force can create strategic options that capital-ship competition cannot.
Chapter · 44:19-47:22
Minelayers as an offset strategy
A smaller navy can use mines to impose disproportionate costs on a stronger opponent, and Brummer shows how the approach worked in practice.