Could HMS Hood have been preserved in concrete?
Concrete preservation might have made Hood treaty-compliant, but experience with Mikasa shows that the method can create severe hull-corrosion problems.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
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Concrete preservation might have made Hood treaty-compliant, but experience with Mikasa shows that the method can create severe hull-corrosion problems.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A British battleship firing twelve or sixteen 14-inch shells every thirty seconds could overwhelm Bismarck through sheer controlled volume.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Scharnhorst's 11-inch weapon evolved from the Deutschland-class gun through the flexibility of built-up construction.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
American treaty concern emphasized the size of British capital ships and cruisers more than the combined capability of numerous smaller ships.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A modern battleship concept combines heavy guns, layered armor, multiple VLS types, dense close defense, helicopters, and conventional integrated propulsion.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
The Royal Navy remained wet because Britain never adopted national prohibition, and shipboard bars still serve a social and alliance role.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Britain either had to stay out or accept a potentially permanent rupture with the United States by pressing the operation through quickly.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Giving every British capital ship later-generation visual rangefinding would transform the Grand Fleet's ability to hit the High Seas Fleet.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A uniform 10.5 cm battery would improve dual-purpose fire and rapid defence against aircraft and destroyers while sacrificing heavy surface effect.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A larger inheritance of C-, D-, and E-class cruisers adds numbers but does not remove age, treaty, and mission pressures behind the County-class program.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Roosevelt's death exposed an American coordination system that depended heavily on his personal authority and administrative control.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Rebuilding battleship design, yard, armor, training, and support capacity makes deployment a six-to-seven-year project.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Updated 8-inch Mark 71 guns with modern guided ammunition could make Zumwalt useful and ease the first stage of Arleigh Burke replacement.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Shared hull families can lower production costs, but every variant inherits compromises made for the others.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Even a rapid heavy-gun autoloader leaves roughly thirty seconds between rounds, making forced-air cooling more plausible than a water jacket.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Reliance on Arleigh Burke destroyers leaves too little distinction between routine presence, a warning, and carrier-group escalation.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
The apparent gap in Royal Navy battleships reflects changing terminology, not the disappearance of the battle-fleet function.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A practical US destroyer leader could use an Atlanta-like hull with fewer guns and more space for command staff.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A Danish modular patrol-ship concept offers a useful Kingston-class baseline, although Canadian procurement politics could resist its modular system.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A layered sequence from patrol ship to frigate, destroyer, flagship, and battle fleet gives diplomacy several visible levels of pressure.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A cruiser provided a rapid, credible warning that Britain could intervene if a 1920s government failed to protect diplomats and hostages.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Repeated public questions can make naval readiness a political issue that ministers must be prepared to answer.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Railguns remain technically plausible, but barrel materials have not caught up with the stresses imposed by the weapon.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Dry-dock size is primarily an investment choice, and Mersey-side expansion concepts offered room for very large wartime construction.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A 38 cm-armed Scharnhorst would arrive too late to change the ordered Dunkerques, but could accelerate France's move to the Richelieu class.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Each presence tier needs a visible increase in capability, so the lowest rung should begin with a modest sloop rather than a fully armed frigate.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A 137-cruiser Royal Navy would nearly double the planned force and make British presence much harder for the Axis powers to counter.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Factories in India and Ceylon could shorten Allied supply lines and strengthen air power in the Mediterranean and Far East.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A determined British demand for enough ships to sustain three ocean fleets might win a larger capital-ship and carrier allowance.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A future cruiser needs a modern hull form rather than another enlargement of an already crowded 1960s-1970s design lineage.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
The live estimate settles near 100 rounds per gun, with an 80-round treaty load, while conflicting notes and the earlier twelve-gun layout leave uncertainty.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
The Royal Navy effectively created a war-build Town-class derivative in the stripped-down Crown Colony class.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Introducing Proteus and Olympus turbines in the Type 12 frigates could give the Royal Navy useful experience before the Type 82 programme.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Separate carousels are one solution for armour-piercing and high-explosive rounds, but the ship could instead standardise on a versatile armour-piercing shell.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A treaty-era imperial buildup would emphasize cruisers, destroyers, ports, dockyards, and possibly sub-10,000-ton escort carriers.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Building a Courageous-sized carrier from the keel up would remove conversion-driven funnel trunking and awkward internal compromises.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
The Meteor's expected front-line life did not justify the aircraft and carrier modifications needed to introduce it at sea.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
British mass production could lower unit cost, while an Australian build could justify itself by creating Far Eastern repair and support capacity.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
A rebuild completed to plan and without consuming the available budget could make similar carrier modernizations viable.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
Britain's global trade-defense and economic-warfare missions make another battlecruiser generation likely even without the First World War.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
The arrival of R-class battleships and their successors would begin pushing 12-inch ships into second-line and reserve duties from about 1916 onward.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
If Britain adopted the Canadair Argus for maritime patrol, its airborne-early-warning requirement would make an AEW derivative likely.
From Bruships 130: Battleships ·
HMDS Danmark fit the theme and schedule of the first Key Ships series, while the more consequential Rolf Krake needed more research and recording time.
Danish troops, capable commanders, and defensible terrain produced a credible resistance in 1864, but Austria and Prussia held overwhelming combined power.
Alternative cotton production and the Emancipation Proclamation made British intervention for the Confederacy increasingly implausible. Anti-slavery experience on the West Africa Station also inclined Royal Navy officers toward the Union blockade.
Rolf Krake's seagoing Coles-type turret arrangement gives it a stronger technical claim to naval significance than the short-lived Danmark.
Ship selection balances the theme of each series, research time, and the quality of available historical sources.
British intervention was unlikely as a voluntary pro-Confederate policy, but Union provocation could have forced a punitive naval response with major strategic effects.