British and American carrier priorities followed from different operating geographies and industrial assumptions. The US Navy could use Pacific space, speed, maneuver, and industrial depth to favor large strike groups. The Royal Navy also expected Pacific service, but a damaged carrier on the far side of the world could be absent for months, while Mediterranean operations offered little room to evade air attack. As American forces approached Japan and lost some of that maneuver room, greater protection became more attractive in the Midway design. Audacious and Malta-class thinking moved the British toward larger air groups without surrendering survivability. The designs converge on the need for enough aircraft to matter and enough protection to operate in hostile waters.
Notable Point · 18:15-25:21
British and American carrier doctrine by geography
The closing design argument compares British and American carrier choices through geography, industrial distance, Mediterranean choke points, Midway, Audacious, and Malta-class thinking.