Britain could absorb the failure of HMS Dreadnought more easily than its competitors could absorb a comparable experiment. The Royal Navy still possessed a large battle fleet and had conventional pre-dreadnought designs in production, so an unsuccessful turbine, gunnery, or fire-control package would not leave the country exposed. Percy Scott's salvo-fire ideas were among the systems being tested. Strategic security gave Britain a choice between resting on its existing superiority and trying new ideas in service. Royal Navy designers had a longer record of experimental ironclads and battleships, including conspicuous failures such as HMS Captain. Institutional strength provided room to learn from a risky ship as well as the prestige that encouraged others to imitate her.
Chapter · 16:34-18:58
Britain had the margin to risk the Dreadnought experiment
Royal Navy numerical strength and ongoing conventional construction made 1905 a comparatively safe moment to test turbines, all-big-gun armament, and new fire-control ideas.