The distinct missions of battleships and battlecruisers

Was the Royal Navy naive to expect its battlecruisers to stay outside the battle line?

The argument here is that Britain's battleships already supplied numerical superiority, leaving the battlecruisers free for fast manoeuvre and flank protection. Their effective use still depended on command and communications.

Battleships gained strength by remaining concentrated, while battlecruisers could operate on distant stations and hunt surface raiders. The Jutland comparison gives the Royal Navy 28 dreadnought battleships against Germany's 16 dreadnoughts, five battlecruisers, and six pre-dreadnoughts, before adding the nine British battlecruisers. That numerical advantage underpins the criticism that Jellicoe did not need battlecruisers to complete his battle line. A separate fast force could instead have manoeuvred around a German fleet constrained by its pre-dreadnoughts' speed. This alternative depended on a commander and communications staff able to control the force reliably. Distrust of Beatty offers a possible explanation for Jellicoe preferring to keep the ships closer under his control. Battlecruisers operating outside the line would also have helped guard against threats approaching its flanks.