Japan hoped that Pearl Harbor and the Philippines would provoke an enraged US fleet into charging westward. Japanese submarines, aircraft, cruisers, and destroyers could then attrit that advance before the battle line delivered a decisive blow. American naval officers had made Mahan, Pacific planning, and repeated war games part of their education, and they recognized that a headlong rush was the worst available response. The Doolittle Raid demonstrated that the United States could act without accepting Japan's preferred operational script. A Roman-versus-Greek analogy frames the deeper strategic mismatch: Japan sought a battle that could enable negotiation, while the United States had the resources and political disposition to rebuild after defeat and continue until it dictated peace.
Notable Point · 4:43-9:28
American war planning refused Japan's expected Pacific charge
Japan expected Pearl Harbor and the Philippines to provoke a headlong American advance, but US naval education had already tested and rejected that response.