Task Force 67 had formed only on 24 November, and Wright replaced Thomas Kinkaid on the 28th, leaving him two days in command before the battle. The force was to use its leading destroyers for the first torpedo attack, then clear them away so the cruisers could fire. American planners still did not appreciate the Type 93 torpedo's long range and assumed Japanese torpedoes were broadly comparable to their own. Floatplanes were meant to illuminate the targets with flares at 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The scheme carried several risks: recovering floatplanes at night, exposing friendly ships with flares, and losing track of withdrawing destroyers.
Notable Point · 44:16-49:30
The American plan for radar, torpedoes, and cruiser fire
The intended sequence was a destroyer torpedo surprise followed by cruiser gunfire on flare-lit targets, but the plan depended on tight coordination.