The 2015 register places terrorism, state conflict, cyberattack, public-health crises, natural hazards, and overseas instability into risk tiers. Those tiers combine likelihood and impact rather than ranking the subjects by importance alone. Listing a danger does not establish preparedness, as reduced helicopter numbers despite the armed forces' flood-response role and the later COVID experience illustrate. International conflict and attacks on overseas territories imply assured air defence, carrier availability, and escort mass rather than capabilities that exist only as future intentions. The already-paid development cost of Type 45 and the ships' unused capacity for strategic-length vertical-launch cells illustrate opportunities lost when production stopped at six. A published risk assessment should visibly shape procurement decisions and the forces available to answer each category.
Notable Point ยท 2:11:36-2:16:20
When the 2015 risk register did not match the force
The 2015 review acknowledged state conflict and attacks on overseas territories, yet its force choices did not provide the depth those risks implied.